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Abstract 
This chapter, based on ethnographic fieldwork, explores cosmopolitanism through the 
prism of unifying and dividing processes and their impact on the identity of young 
Armenians living within the Armenian community in southern Russia’s Krasnodar krai. The 
empirical research presented shows the ways in which cosmopolitan practices allow young 
Armenians to draw selectively on a variety of discursive cultural meanings, enabling them to 
combine sameness and difference into their everyday lives. Sameness is understood in terms 
of belonging to the Armenian diaspora – a discourse of unity that is encouraged by Armenian 
voluntary organizations and the Armenian Apostolic Church. Conversely, difference is the 
result of diverse narratives of migration, different places of origin and different dialects of 
Armenian language which all serve to form a hierarchy of power within the Armenian 
diaspora in Krasnodar krai.  
 
Introduction 
For centuries, Armenian history and culture has been characterised by various waves of 
migration, some forced, some voluntary. In particular, the expulsion of Armenians from their 
traditional homelands in eastern Turkey in 1915
1
 resulted in large-scale dispersion and, 
consequently, the formation of the Armenian spyurk (diaspora) as a social category (Safran 
1991), that differ from the previous notion of gahtavair (cf. Panossian 2006). A further 
distinction was made during Soviet times between Armenians belonging to internal and 
external diaspora – those from the blizhnoe zarubiezhe (the “near abroad”), Armenian 
communities in Russia and other former Soviet republics) and those from the dalnoe 
zarubiezhe (“far away”, Armenian communities in Europe, America and the Middle East) (cf. 
Shahnazarian 2013). In turn, the establishment of an independent Republic of Armenia in 
                                                 
1
 Many Armenians were killed during this period although the exact number is strongly contested. The 
most commonly accepted number of Armenian fatalities is around 1.5million people – roughly 60 per cent of 
Turkey’s Armenian population at that time (Hoffman 2006: 71). The events of 1915 are often cited as the first 
state ‘genocide’ of the twentieth century.  
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1991 has underscored the division between those living there (hayastansty) and those living 
abroad (cf. Darieva 2012). Thus, despite being formally united as a single nation, Armenians 
are internally diverse in terms of their culture and identity, exacerbated by the fact that of the 
approximately seven million Armenians in the world (Kurkchiyan & Herzig 2005: 2) at least 
one half are assumed to live outside the homeland (Pattie 2005: 126).
2
   
Since Armenians started moving to Russia in the eighteenth century, they have struggled 
to renegotiate their identity and their relationship with Armenia, while at the same time 
establishing themselves in their new country of settlement. During Soviet times, most 
Armenians living outside the Armenian SSR
3
 were able to preserve many elements of their 
distinctive culture, despite the state authorities’ attempts to eradicate national differences.  
Nevertheless, they became highly influenced by the concepts of “people’s friendship” 
(druzhba narodov) and the ‘Soviet people’ (sovetskiî narod) (Oussatcheva 2001). As a result, 
many Armenians found it hard to think of themselves as members of a diaspora, considering 
themselves citizens of a single homeland – the USSR (Libardian 1999). Such terms as the 
Russian language’s “diaspora” or the Armenian “spyurk” were hardly used in everyday 
parlance (Lourie 1999). This, however, all changed when the Soviet Union collapsed. 
Armenia became an independent country, ethnic conflicts emerged in the South Caucasus, 
and a fresh wave of Armenian migrants came to Russia.  
This chapter explores the unifying and dividing processes within the contemporary 
Armenian community in Krasnodar krai, in southern Russia. It discusses the complex 
problems which arise when numerous waves of Armenian migrants, differentiated by the 
time and departure point of their migration, meet in one place. The aim of this chapter is to 
show that, despite attempts at unification by local Armenian voluntary associations and the 
Armenian Apostolic Church, there are major differences between the “new” and “old” 
Armenian diaspora. These differences are reinforced by the political discourse in Krasnodar 
krai, which portrays migration as a problem for the region.  
This chapter draws on data gathered during on-going ethnographic fieldwork conducted 
in Krasnodar since 2006, including participant observation, in-depth interviews and press 
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 Reliable, recent figures are difficult to obtain, so this data is based on estimates.  
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 Despite the fact that many Armenians lived outside their ethnic republic, the Armenian SSR was the most 




 The chapter begins by providing an overview of local migration politics as well as 
Armenian migration to Krasnodar krai, followed by a discussion of the concepts of diaspora, 
identity and cosmopolitanism. It then proceeds to examine the history and development of 
Armenian voluntary associations and the Armenian Apostolic Church as unifying institutions. 
The final part of this chapter discusses the dynamic ways in which identity politics are 
currently being negotiated within the local Armenian diaspora.  
 
Armenian Migration and Identity Politics in Krasnodar Krai
5
 
As a result of large-scale migration flows, Krasnodar krai, has become one of Russia’s 
most ethnically diverse regions. According to the 2002 population census, Krasnodar krai has 
a population of around five million, with Russians constituting the majority (86.56 per cent or 
4,436,272 people).
6
 Armenians have a long and established history in Krasnodar krai dating 
back to the eighteenth century and are currently one of the largest ethnic minorities in the 
krai, officially comprising 5.36 per cent (274,566) of the region’s total population 
(Krasnodarskii kraevoi komitet gosudarstvennoi statistiki 2005). Armenians arrived in 
Krasnodar krai via several waves of migration. The two most significant being the wave that 
followed the Armenian genocide between 1915 and 1920 with approximately 30,000 
Armenians fleeing to the region (Ter-Sarkisiants 1995) and the wave of Armenian migrants 
following the ethnic conflict in the Caucasus in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter 
included Armenians fleeing Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh (1988-1994), refugees from 
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict (1992-1994), and forced re-settlers from Chechnya (1994-
1996 and 1999-2001).  
When large numbers of migrants and refugees (not only Armenians) came to the region 
following these and other ethnic conflicts, Krasnodar krai’s authorities faced major 
difficulties in developing an effective migration regime. As a political reaction to these waves 
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 Part of the research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (2006-2008) and by the 
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2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b).  
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 Source: Krasnodarskiî kraevoî komitet gosudarstvennoî statistiki (2005). Data from the most recent 
population census in 2011 was still inaccessible at the time of writing.  
 4 
of migrants, which generally were perceived as a security threat and a threat to a ‘healthy’ 
ethnic balance, the authorities turned to institutionalised discrimination against ethnic 
minorities. In this way, regardless of when a given group of Armenians settled in Krasnodar 
krai, most find themselves affected by the issue of recent migration.  
On the other hand, coexisting with this negative approach to migration is an official 
discourse at the regional and federal levels which attempts to promote cultural diversity, and 
some ethnic voluntary organisations are financially supported by the public purse. For 
example, the krai’s regional budget sets aside two million roubles annually to support various 
projects for the Shapsughs – a sub-tribe of the Western Adyghs – and the federal authorities’ 
have provided support in various forms for other indigenous groupings in Russia (Osipov 
2004: 14). Such an approach is universal in Russia, but it is particularly strong in the official 
politics of Krasnodar krai.
7
  
Noteworthy here is that the ethnic composition of Krasnodar krai has not changed 
significantly since 1989. According to the 1989 and 2002 censuses the ethnic Russian 
population was, respectively, 86.71 per cent and 86.56 per cent of the total population 
(Krasnodarskiî kraevoî komitet gosudarstvennoî statistiki 2005).  This contradicts Krasnodar 
krai’s public discourse, with its emphasis on the decline of the ethnic Russian population. 
Instead, census data confirms that since 1989 the ethnic composition of the krai’s population 
has only changed slightly, due in part to the arrival of Slavic re-settlers (pereselentsy) to the 
region from other parts of Russia (Sokolov-Mitrich 2007:10). For example, in 2001 
approximately 90 per cent of all newcomers were Russian citizens, and 82 per cent were 
ethnic Russians (Popov 2005: 52-53). A similar opinion was expressed by Zhurbin (2005), 
that according to statistics on ‘ethnic’ migration, Russians predominate in migration 
numbers.
8
 This opinion is often contradicted by other sources, for example, Rakachev and 
Rakacheva (2003), who claim that Armenian migrants comprise the largest group based on 
ethnicity. Following the official anti-migration discourse, experts in the field predominantly 
discuss migration in terms of illegal migration as a threat to the region’s stability and 
                                                 
7
 The discourse of cultural diversity has grown significantly in the past few years in order to create a 
positive image of the region in preparation for the Winter Olympics in Sochi.  
8
 Interview with M.S. Zhurbin on 25 August 2005, conducted by R. Kuznetsova, at the Centre for Pontic 
and Caucasian Studies (Krasnodar), as part of a mini-project on migration conducted for the RIME Project 
2004-2006, University of Warwick. 
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disturbing the region’s demographic balance, ignoring the fact that this is an internal 
migration of Russian citizens that prevails. 
The proportion of Armenians in Russia in general, and in Krasnodar krai in particular, 
has nonetheless increased in recent years.and this is often portrayed negatively in the press. 
For example: ‘At present several million Armenians live in Russia, but only about 15,000 
Russians live in Armenia…’(Begletsov 2004: 1-2). According to official Russian statistics 
every fourth Armenian in Russia lives in Krasnodar krai, and as Alexandr Tkachev, the 
governor of Krasnodar krai, claims: ‘there are approximately one million Armenians in the 
krai’.9 In addition, the official regional discourse often contains different opinions regarding 
the exact number of Armenians living in Krasnodar Krai. In contrast to governor Tkachev, 
who claims that one million Armenians reside in the region, Kuznetsov (2002), an expert on 
Armenians in living in Krasnodar Krai, suggests that there are no more than 350,000. As 
stated earlier, however, according to the population census from 2002, only 274,566 
Armenians are recorded as living in this part of Russia (Krasnodarskiî kraevoi komitet 
gosudarstvennoî statistiki 2005). These differences in opinion on the number of Armenians in 
Krasnodar krai raise doubts about the reliability of the census data, which is viewed as 
capturing only a part of the actual population.
10
 Thus, there is the widespread assumption that 
there are many more (unregistered) Armenians than these figures suggest.  
 
Diasporic Identities in Cosmopolitan Perspective 
Social science literature is rife with debate concerning what diaspora is and how it should 
be defined. The concept of diaspora has been used to write about displaced people, migrants, 
and transnational peoples. While some scholars, like King and Melvin (1999/2000: 10), 
define diaspora as an “ethnic community divided by states,” others, like Lavie and 
                                                 
9
 Armiane Kubani film by Artem Erkanian (2005). 
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 The questionable accuracy of the 2002 population census can be explained by several shortcomings in 
the data. First, whereas previous Soviet censuses were carried out in a controlled state and compliance with the 
census was mandatory, the 2002 population census was conducted during unstable times, where the 
population’s distrust had increased, which led to difficulties in conducting the census (Heleniak 2003: 431). 
Second, there is the problem of ethnic self-identification, especially with regard to people from ethnically mixed 
origins (cf. Oswald 2000), 
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Swedenburg (1996: 14), describe diaspora in terms of a “doubled relationship or dual loyalty 
that migrants, exiles and refugees have – including their connections to the space they 
currently occupy and their continuing involvement with ‘back home.’” In addition to focusing 
on the home-host relationship, other scholars define diaspora as a type of social form 
(Wahlbeck 2002: 229), and emphasize the transnational character of diasporas and diasporic 
activities which transcend state boundaries (Kelly 2011: 445).  
Many scholars also understand diaspora as a category of analysis which questions 
individual and collective notions of home and homeland, and the impact these notions have 
on identity for those born and raised outside their “traditional” homeland (Brah 1996). Some 
members of a diaspora recognize their homeland as “a mythic place of desire in the diasporic 
imagination, in the sense that it is the place of ‘origin’” (Brah 1996: 192). In contrast, for 
other members of diasporas, their home, the place where they actually live, can appear as 
“the lived experience of a locality” (Brah 1996, Ziemer 2009, 2011b). The dichotomy of the 
“mythic place of origin” and home as daily sensory experience is important not only for any 
migrant’s understanding of previous and current homes, but also for subsequent generations 
raised outside traditional ethnic homelands, for whom ‘home’ may continue to be multiply 
situated (Brah 1996: 197).  
This present study takes a processual view of diasporas in that it considers the ways in 
which a particular social and political reality is constructed. In this respect, diasporic identity 
is also understood as a form of practice. Such an approach incorporates the diverse processes 
of identification. It draws attention to the plurality of identity narratives of a diaspora and the 
processes through which they are selected, practiced, and embodied in everyday life. Taking 
diaspora as practice emphasizes the cosmopolitan which tends to embrace the partial, 
syncretized and ever-changing aspects of identity (Breckenridge et al. 2002). A cosmopolitan 
perspective on diaspora also moves beyond local/national limitations. An individual can 
construct a self-identity through selective cosmopolitanism, moving between home cultures 
and ‘alien cultures’, thereby creating various definitions of home (Hannerz 1990: 240-248). 
While categorically defining cosmopolitanism may be “an uncosmopolitan thing to do” 
(Breckenridge et al. 2002: 1), cosmopolitanism can be described as “ways of living at home 
abroad or abroad at home – ways of inhabiting multiple places at once, of being different 
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beings simultaneously” (Breckenridge et al. 2002: 11). In short, cosmopolitanism is 
understood as a means by which diasporic people draw selectively on a variety of discursive 
cultural meanings, and therefore are able to combine sameness and difference in their 
everyday lives, thus creating unity through diversity.  
 
Unifying Institutions: Armenian Ethnic Voluntary Associations and the Armenian 
Apostolic Church 
The Armenian Apostolic Church and Armenian voluntary associations have played a 
major role in the formation of an Armenian diasporic community in Krasnodar krai. 
Although many Armenians voluntarily migrated to this part of Russia before 1915, 
Armenians who came to the region immediately after 1915 were refugees and had survived 
traumatic experiences of loss and suffering. Thus, their desire to return home one day and 
keep the memory of the homeland alive was particularly strong. Not surprisingly, this group 
engaged in activities which concentrated on preserving, revitalizing, and reproducing 
memories of the old original homeland to form a sense of community and belonging. 
Initially, this took place through the formation of religious and educational institutions. 
   Armenian voluntary associations first appeared in southern Russia at the end of the 
nineteenth century. In 1889, for example, a branch of the Armyanskoe blagotvoritel’noe 
obshchestvo na Kavkaze (Armenian Charitable Society in the Caucasus, ACC), originally 
founded in 1881 in Tbilisi, was opened in the Krasnodar region (Simonyan 2003: 33). By 
1882, members of the ACC in Tbilisi had already established links to Armenians in 
Krasnodar krai by making short visits to Armavir and Ekaterinodar to collect donations. 
Moreover, national parties, such as “Hnchak” or “Dashnaktsutyun” started to operate in the 
North-West Caucasus, leading to a political mobilization of the local Armenian diaspora 
(Karapetyan 2006). Noteworthy here is that during the initial period of Armenian migration 
to the Kuban region,
11
 the Russian government introduced laws which stimulated Armenian 
diasporic activities and the migration process itself (Khachaturyan 2000). The settlers 
received many privileges, such as the right to organize their own system of self-government 
within their ethnic settlements (Simonyan 2003: 162).  
                                                 
11
 Krasnodar krai is also known as Kuban region named after the Kuban River flowing through the region. 
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Yet, when the number of Armenian migrants continued to increase beyond the control of 
the Russian government, and when Armenian national parties gained more political 
influence, the Russian government started to restrict earlier privileges which it had granted to 
Armenian migrants. Ultimately, this led to the closure of Armenian schools in the Caucasus 
in 1896, as well as Armenian voluntary associations in 1898. As the Armenian Apostolic 
Church often served as a “mediator” for the Kuban Armenian diaspora with the Armenian 
diaspora in other regions and countries, as well as with Armenia itself, the Tsarist 
administration and later the Soviet government perceived this role negatively; since it was 
considered the main obstacle to the policy of Russification. The Soviet government thus 
introduced measures to also weaken the influence of the Church, such as removing the 
Armenian clergy from the education process in national schools and confiscating Church 
property in 1903. 
From 1907 onwards, however, various Armenian voluntary associations were re-opened 
or established anew in Krasnodar krai, including the first two ethnic voluntary women’s 
associations, the “Armenian Charitable Society for Women” (Armyanskoe zhenskoe 
blagotvoritel’noe obshchestvo), in Maikop, and the “Armenian Charitable Society for Ladies” 
(Armyanskoe damskoe blagotvoritel’noe obshchestvo) in Ekaterinodar (Simonyan 2003:34). 
The activities of these voluntary associations were primarily educational, as well as helping 
orphans and children from poor families. Membership fees and cultural fundraising events 
paid for these activities. The Armenian voluntary associations not only focused on the 
Armenian community, but generally served the well-being of the whole region.  
After the 1917 Revolution and the subsequent establishment of the Soviet Union in 
December 1922, the Armenian Church was heavily repressed and Armenian political parties 
were banned. For thirty-two years, there was no Armenian church in Krasnodar krai and only 
two Armenian churches were active in the whole of the North-West Caucasus. Furthermore, 
Soviet policies negatively affected all aspects of Armenian diasporic life, although Armenian 
newspapers and educational institutions functioned in some periods. The situation changed 
from the end of the 1980s onwards, when, as part of the process of a national-cultural 
renaissance in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period, numerous Armenian voluntary 
associations were established anew. This process – an “unexpected outcome” of the political 
changes of this period (Burawoy & Verdery 1999) – was further strengthened in the 
Armenian case by the Karabakh war (Lourie 1999). Yet this revival was also the outcome of 
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the national and local political discourse in Krasnodar krai to support ethnic voluntary 
associations, despite a negative approach to migration.  
Nowadays, there are many different Armenian associations throughout Krasnodar krai. 
While some have only a few members, others have several hundred. Some are funded and 
supported by the local government, while others are privately financed.
12
 For example, the 
Armenian cultural magazine, Khachkar is fully funded by Krasnodar-based Armenian 
businessman Andreî Amosov. In an interview with the author, 13  Amosov identified the 
revival and maintenance of Armenian traditions as well as raising awareness of Armenian 
cultural values amongst young Armenians in Krasnodar as major aims of his cultural 
magazine. He complained that many second and third generation Armenians are often unable 
to speak Armenian and appreciate the Khachkar magazine in the same way as the older 
generations. 
Voluntary associations aim to meet the cultural, social and political needs of Armenians 
living in Krasnodar krai. Some, like Armyanskaia Pashkovskaya Obshchina (Armenian 
Pashkovskiî Association,14 APO), offer opportunities in all three areas, while others, like the 
Obshchestvo Armyanskoî Kul’tury i Miloserdiya im. M. Mashtotsa (M. Mashtots – 
Association of Armenian Culture and Charity), are more focused on cultural and social 
activities and are state-funded. It is important to note that most state-funded ethnic 
associations are set up in order to promote the official government discourse of ethnic 
diversity in the region and to limit diasporic political activities. Many Armenian associations, 
whether privately or state-funded, are involved in organizing concerts, lectures and other 
cultural events. For example, in 2006, the APO together with the Armenian Church in 
Krasnodar organized a series of concerts in which famous artists from Armenia performed in 
Krasnodar, such as the popular duduk player Djivan Gasparyan. Staging traditional Armenian 
religious festivals at Christmas and Easter, national celebrations such as Armenia’s Day of 
Independence and the annual commemoration of the Armenian genocide are also of central 
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importance. In addition, on a daily basis, most of these organizations offer Armenian 
language, dance and singing classes.  
In the political sphere, many Armenian associations are actively engaged in supporting 
Armenia’s petitions for official recognition of the Armenian genocide and in lobbying for 
migrants’ rights to vote in Armenia’s elections. Engaging with homeland politics is a top 
priority on their agenda. An example can be seen in the visit to Krasnodar made by the 
President of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Bako Sahakyan, in February 2010. As part of 
his visit, Sahakyan not only met with the heads of Armenian voluntary associations, but he 
also visited an Armenian Sunday school on the premises of the Armenian Church where he 
socialized with teachers and students, before making a public speech to the greater Armenian 
community.  
By these and other activities Armenian voluntary associations not only contribute to 
creating stronger links between the diaspora and the homeland, but also try to bridge the gap 
between recent Armenian migrants and members of the older diaspora. 
 
Internal Hierarchies and Divisions 
Armenian voluntary associations attempt to represent the interests of all Armenians, 
including recent Armenian migrants and local “old” Armenian diaspora. However, complex 
cultural, generational, social and structural differences between migrant cohorts have resulted 
in a particular relationship of power among various Armenian sub-groups, based on symbolic 
articulations of cultural specificities mainly relating to country of origin and diverse 
migration experiences. Thus, despite the unifying attempts of Armenian organizations and the 
Armenian Apostolic Church, a noticeable feature of the local Armenian diaspora in 
Krasnodar krai is a powerful set of boundaries within the local Armenian community. This 
internal diversity is also well-known to and emphasized by the regional authorities as a 
political tool to justify their discriminatory practices. On several occasions, Aleksandr 
Tkachev, the regional governor, has relied on these internal divisions in his speeches to 
rationalize his policies:  
 
“Those who live legally here, Armenians, Georgians and other nationalities – these are 
our people, our fellow-countrymen (zemlyaki), these are Kuban people and we don’t 
make any distinctions. What I am talking about is illegal migrants, those who came to 
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Kuban in the last two, three or five years, and I know that there are already tensions with 
those who came from Armenia (Tkachev 2004).
15” 
 
This line of argument is also held by Nikolaî Gromov, the ataman of the Kuban 
Cossacks,
16
 who suggests:  
 
“When speaking about Armenians, we clearly distinguish between those who are our 
local Armenians – they are “ours” – and those new ones, who have come in the last 10 to 
15 years to the region and whom even local Armenians don’t accept (Gromov 2005).17” 
 
The above extracts highlight the ways in which local politicians reinforce divisions 
between “old” and “new” Armenians in public discourse. These divisions are also 
acknowledged and practiced within the Armenian diaspora itself. In this respect, it is useful 
to consider Barth’s (1969) argument that it is the process of inter-group contact that generates 
cultural meanings through a boundary dividing “us” from “them.” Gupta and Ferguson (2002) 
link this approach to an understanding of power relations. For them, constructing difference 
is a means by which to establish a hierarchy of power.  
Unlike pre-perestroika Armenian migrants, who are well integrated into local society, 
many of those who have arrived from 1988 onwards face not only general challenges in the 
Russian host society; they also experience distrust and, sometimes, rejection from members 
of their own diasporic community. A substantial contributing factor to such a rejection can be 
found in the negative media portrayal of migrants in terms of illegality and crime (cf. Roman 
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2002). Hence, some representatives of the old Armenian diaspora in Krasnodar krai consider 
newcomers to be criminals whose activity negatively influences the attitudes of the Russian 
population and authorities towards everyone of South Caucasian or North Caucasian descent, 
as a 27 year-old female local Armenian tells us: 
 
“Even though I belong to the ‘old’ Armenian diaspora, I don’t think that these 
newcomers are necessarily criminals. I wouldn’t even say the ‘old’ Armenians 
reject them – on the contrary, most of the ‘old’ ones try to help, like the obshchina 
[Armyanskaya Pashkovskaya Obshchina, APO], for example. Even if they are 
rejected by officials, they can still find a decent job here without becoming a 
criminal. In my opinion, they just don’t want to adapt. The thing is you can’t do 
here what you used to do at home. They have to behave in the same way as we do 
in Krasnodar. What also doesn’t help is that both old and new are quite arrogant 
sometimes. The new ones think and pretend everything is better in Armenia or 
wherever they come from and the old ones just look down on them because of 
their clothes and so on.” 
 
Although this research participant maintains that she does not reject newcomers, she 
expresses a certain discontent caused by the way new migrants behave in the host society. 
One could argue that, with such views and stereotypes, local Armenians themselves reinforce 
the political discourse which portrays any new migrants as a disturbance to society in 
Krasnodar krai. In a sense, such an understanding is deeply rooted in the recent history and 
economy of the host country. While the government tends to portray the arrival of new 
migrants as disturbing the ethnic balance in the region, another likely influencing factor is 
that most migrants heading to Russia from Armenia tend to be temporary, rural and unskilled 
migrants (Gevorkyan et al. 2006). Furthermore, because of the newcomers’ different 
behaviour, they are viewed as damaging the image and reputation of the long-established and 
well-integrated local Armenian community in the eyes of the host society. As the next 
female, a 27-year-old representative of the “old” diaspora, describes:  
 
“Those [Armenians] from Baku came to Krasnodar 20 years ago. They already have 
everything here […] they have lived in Krasnodar for quite a long time now […]. they have 
their circle of friends and their status in society. Well, and when these new ones arrived, 
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especially from Armenia in the 1990s, we could feel the impact immediately. We felt it, us 
‘local’ Armenians, that they were from Yerevan. But for Russians, we all look the same. For 
Russians, it doesn’t matter where Armenians come from, they are still Armenians.” 
  
In addition to those boundaries created as a result of different arrival dates and different 
degrees of adaptation on the part of migrants, a major internal boundary between Armenians 
stems from a sense of community based on place of origin (zemlyachestvo). Such identity is 
particularly strong among newcomers and today one can discern several groups divided 
according to this principle. First, there are the Azerbaijani Armenians who came to the region 
in the late 1980s during the Karabakh conflict. This group may be subdivided into those 
Armenians who came from the capital city of Baku and its industrial satellite towns, such as 
Sumgait, and those who came from the city of Kirovabad and nearby villages, including 
Goranboy raion (or the Shahumyan region in Armenian). Second, there are the Karabakh 
Armenians (Artsakh Armenians), and third, the Georgian Armenians from Tbilisi, Javakhk 
and Abkhazia.
18
 The Abkhazian group, it should be noted, mostly consists of Hamshen 
Armenians (Simonyan 2003: 145).
19
 Finally, there are those Armenians from Armenia who 
left the country after the earthquake in 1988 and as a result of worsening socio-economic 
conditions in the 1990s. 
In this context, it should be noted that much has been made of the basic cultural 
differences between “Eastern” and “Western” Armenians, including their different linguistic 
dialects (cf. Shahnazarian 2013). While it is true that most post-Soviet Armenians speak 
Eastern Armenian and most established diasporic Armenians speak Western Armenian, 
Iranian Armenians, for example, who have never been part of the Soviet Union, still speak 
Eastern Armenian. In Krasnodar krai the existence of this linguistic diversity and local 
dialects creates some barriers to integration. In interviews, research participants would often 
deny that these differences are important, yet on the everyday level they do have a certain 
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 They came to Krasnodar krai in the 1990s primarily due to the harsh socio-economic conditions in 
Georgia at that time. 
19
 Hamshen Armenians were originally Christian Armenians but over the centuries evolved into a distinct 
ethnic group converted to Islam .  
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influence, as the next extract from an interview with a 24-year-old local Armenian woman 
shows:  
 
“No, it doesn’t matter to me whether the person is an Azerbaijani Armenian […]. Well, 
first of all, I can hardly understand their language [she means the different dialect]. Well, if 
it’s not your native language, then it’s hard to understand, especially those Baku Armenians, 
it’s really terrible. I just can’t understand anything they want. Well, in general, I have 
acquaintances and friends who are Baku Armenians and we get on. I can’t really say anything 
bad.” 
 
From this interview excerpt, one can see that as the interviewee emphasizes the “cultural” 
diversity between her and her friends, she is indirectly talking about the internal hierarchies 
of the Armenian diaspora, in the sense that she knows about internal divisions, while denying 
that she would act in a way to perpetuate them. In the context of her remarks, it should 
perhaps be acknowledged that what she is saying should not be separated from her 
“audience” (Brown 1998). It illustrates that, for someone “perceived” to be an outsider (in 
this case, the interviewer) these internal cultural divisions are portrayed as only minor, having 
hardly any significance for the overall unity of the Armenian diaspora in Krasnodar. 
However, and as the subsequent discussion illustrates, there is evidence to suggest the 
contrary.  
Along with language differences, there are also other visible cultural differences, which 
create hierarchical distinctions. In this “cultural hierarchy”, Armenians who fled Baku and 
other Azerbaijani cities, or those who are from Nagorno Karabakh, are ranked lowest and are 
often looked down upon by the old diaspora in Krasnodar, but also by more recent Yerevan 
Armenians in Krasnodar. This is partly due to the fact that they are thought to have lived far 
too close to a Muslim society during Soviet times, adopting some of their customs and 
traditions. Such stigmatizing differentiations ignore the cosmopolitan nature of Baku in 
Soviet times (Grant 2010) and are largely made as a result of Armenia’s enduring resistance 
to Muslim conquest and the traumatic experience of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman 
Turkey in 1915. Both Baku and Nagorno Karabakh Armenians are often perceived as “false 
Christians,” owing to secularizing processes during Soviet times, as well as to their past, 
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having lived  in predominantly Muslim milieu. For example, in the summer of 2009, during 
an Armenian cultural gathering, the author overheard a priest from the Armenian Church in 
Krasnodar calling Nagorno Karabakh Armenians “bezbozhniki” (“non-believers”) in a heated 
argument over church attendance.  
While Nagorno Karabakh Armenians seem to be placed at the bottom of this internal 
hierarchy and differentiations within the Armenian diaspora in Krasnodar, at the top of this 
hierarchy, there are Armenians from Erevan. They perceive themselves as ‘proper’ 
Armenians, as they come from the “cultural centre” of the Armenian nation. As a reaction, 
other Armenians often describe them as being arrogant and conceited. One 26-year old 
female local Armenian, for example, maintains that Armenians from Erevan come to 
Krasnodar krai and other parts of Russia thinking they have a “genuine” Armenian culture. 
This research participant describes these cultural differences by referring to one Armenian 
from Erevan:   
 
“…Well, and then there is E. [a priest] in the church – he is such a Erevan Armenian. 
Well, from head to toe he is a Erevan Armenian, there’s nothing in this world better than him 
[…]. You know his regal attitude: ‘We are Erevan Armenians, we are the world’s proper 
Armenians.” Well, they refer to all other kinds of Armenians as if they are below them...” 
 
Another 23-year-old female research participant, whose parents originally came from 
Baku, also talks about these cultural differences and hierarchies amongst Armenians, using 
more than one example:  
 
“There are Armenians from Erevan, you know, ‘erevansti’ [uses her fingers to signal 
inverted commas]. I really can’t get on with them. I don’t understand them, and never will 
understand them. They think completely differently from me […]. Well, and then there is A. 
[interviewee’s friend], she is from Tbilisi. You know, in Georgia. Well, in Soviet times this 
didn’t matter and we were all the same, but now even she considers herself different from 
me. Do you understand how complicated this all is, where you are from? And people 
[Armenians] often judge you accordingly, as each of these Armenian groups has a particular 
image. Baku Armenians are considered to be very funny, easy-going and love to go out. 
They’re good-hearted people, and love talking and socializing. Erevan Armenians are 
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considered snobbish, very regal, even in comparison to Armenians from Leninakan 
[Gyumri], who kind of have a funny accent. You see, there are so many jokes about Erevan 
Armenians and their snobbishness.” 
 
It is worth noting that this perceived “snobbish” attitude of Erevan Armenians could also 
be understood in terms of a feeling of inferiority. As indicated in the previous section, not 
only are the poverty levels very high in Armenia, but Armenians in Armenia (including those 
living in Erevan), are also heavily dependent on diaspora remittances. Armenia receives 
approximately $2 billion in remittances every year from the Russian-Armenian diaspora, 
which is an average of 20 per cent of Armenia’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Khachaturian 2008). Hence, presenting themselves to the Armenian diasporic world and the 
host society as “proper” Armenians can be seen as a counterbalance against their 
economically disadvantaged position.  
Interestingly enough, these hierarchies and cultural distinctions are recognized both by 
the members of the “old” Armenian diaspora, and by ‘new’ immigrants as well. As a 25-
year-old male research participant, who moved from Armenia to Krasnodar in 2001 
admitted: 
 
“Well, there are differences – well, if you look at me, I am an Armenian from Armenia 
and I have that character. Well, I was born in Armenia and grew up there. Well, 
everything is different there and we have different ways of thinking.” 
 
Finally, if we take into account visible features, such as differences in clothing, hairstyles 
and behavior, the cultural distinctions between Armenian sub-groups become even more 
obvious and further impose internal divisions and hierarchies. In the next quotation, a female 
Baku Armenian talks about these differences, although she also implies that not all members 
of the Armenian diaspora have the cultural competence to recognize them:  
 
“I’d like to say that I do have stereotypes and I do feel the differences. For instance, if 
you show me a Baku Armenian or an Armenian from Erevan or some Armenian from another 
place […] I can tell [from where he/she is] straight away from his or her behavior, from his or 
her talk and so on. Well, generally, this is quite difficult. You have to grow up with it. For 
example, my parents can easily distinguish and they taught me how to distinguish, but M. 
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[interviewee’s friend] can’t tell the difference. I can, for example, even tell the difference by 
people’s clothes. A couple of years ago this was particularly noticeable. I remember that 
when Armenians came to Krasnodar from Azerbaijani towns like Kirovabad, they all loved to 
wear leather waistcoats [kozhanye zhiletki]. And this is where the stereotype comes from – 
you see, Armenians who like to wear leather waistcoats are Armenians from Kirovabad! 
Also, I can differentiate according to their hairstyles and tell what place an Armenian come 
from. That is very easy, especially regarding those from Erevan. Generally, I can easily see 
when Armenians are from Armenia. Well, I can hear by their language where they are from, 
and by their behaviour, naturally.” 
 
Noteworthy about this quote is that this research participant told the author during the 
interview that she calls herself “Russified” even though she was one of the Armenians who 
came from Azerbaijan to Krasnodar in late 1980s, when she was a baby. From the way  she 
describes these differences, one can see she sets herself apart from these Armenians because 
she is well integrated in Krasnodar society and in fact would rather under-emphasize her 
Armenianness. This summarizes well the above discussion as it highlights the conflicting, as 
well as hierarchizing processes that are lived out by members of the Armenian diaspora.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In the case of the Armenians living in Krasnodar krai, cosmopolitanism operates within 
the diaspora through the acknowledgement of diversity and unity. Unity is expressed by 
emphasizing belonging to one diasporic community. Being a member of this diasporic 
community is characterized by sharing pan-Armenian narratives of migration which have 
formed the diaspora. In the context of Krasnodar krai, these are the Armenian ethnic 
voluntary associations and the Armenian Apostolic Church which seek to create unity by 
celebrating a pan-Armenian culture to which every Armenian can belong. Yet, part of being 
Armenian in Krasnodar krai is the experience of diversity within the Armenian diaspora. 
Diverse narratives of migration, different places of origin, and different dialects of the 
Armenian language have all contributed to a hierarchy of power within one diaspora in a 
specific location, where members of an older established diaspora are challenged by new 
migrants. In this way, one can argue that Armenians in Krasnodar combine strong ethnic 
affiliations with an attitude that recognizes cultural diversity within one people in their 
everyday lives. At the same time, within this milieu members of the ‘old’ diaspora negotiate 
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and at times reinforce these divisions in order to maintain their position in Russian society, 
despite efforts to build up a unified community.  
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